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Bite Your Tongue in Europe: The
European Court of Human Rights Strikes
a Blow to the Freedom of Expression
I. INTRODUCTION
"[D]ebate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and
wide-open...[it] may well include vehement, caustic, and
sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public
officials."1 With this proclamation in New York Times v. Sullivan,
the U.S. Supreme Court committed itself to shaping a legal
framework that placed individual freedom of expression and
freedom of expression of the press at the forefront of democratic
society. Despite this sweeping decree, the U.S. Supreme Court has
manipulated the free speech doctrine in order to achieve desired
legal outcomes. While the United States's commitment to
freedom of expression is broader than any other country's
jurisprudence,3 the European Court of Human Rights ("Court")
similarly manipulates the freedom of expression doctrine in order
to obtain desired legal outcomes.
In 1959, the Court was created to implement the European
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights ("Convention").4
The Council of Europe, formed as a reaction to the war crimes and
human rights atrocities of World War II, established the
Convention in 1950 to give effect to the United Nation's Universal
Declaration of Human Rights.5 The purpose of the Court is to
1. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
2. See Michel Rosenfeld, Hate Speech in Constitutional Jurisprudence: A
Comparative Analysis, 24 CARDOZO L. REV. 1523, 1530 (2003).
3. Elissa A. Okoneiwski, Yahoo!, Inc. v. LICRA: The French Challenge to Freedom
of expression on the Internet, 18 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 295, 302 (2002).
4. Willi Fuhrmann, International Law and Religion Symposium Article: Perspectives
on Religious Freedom from the Vantage Point of the European Court of Human Rights,
2000 BYU L. REV. 829, 829 (2000) (describing the history and purpose of the ECHR).
5. 1d; Keturah A. Dunne, Addressing Religious Intolerance in Europe: The Limited
Application of Article 9 of the European Convention of Human Rights and Fundamental
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
review the decisions of the Contracting States. In this way, the
Court ensures that each Contracting State upholds the
"democratic belief that certain fundamental rights and freedoms of
the individual should not be subordinated to the power or narrow
political convenience of the State.
'
,
6
Article 10 of the Convention sets forth the parameters of the
freedom of expression rights.7 Article 10(1) enumerates those
fundamental freedom of expression rights protected under the
Convention. Article 10(2) lists the limits that may be placed on
those fundamental rights. The article states:
(1) Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right
shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and
impart information and ideas without interference by public
authority and regardless of frontiers. This Article shall not
prevent States from requiring the licensing of broadcasting,
television or cinema enterprises.
(2) The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties
and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities,
conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and
are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national
security, territorial integrity or publft safety, for the prevention
of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for
the protection of the reputation or the rights of others, for
preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence,
or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the
judiciary.10
To determine whether there has been a violation of an
applicant's Article 10 rights, the Court must first establish whether
there has been an interference with the applicant's Article 10(1)
rights. If the Court finds interference, then pursuant to Article
10(2) it must determine whether the interference is prescribed by
Freedoms, 30 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 117, 128 (1999). See generally Helen Mountfield,
Regulatory Expropriations in Europe: The Approach of the European Court of Human
Rights, 11 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 136, 138 (2002).
6. Dunne, supra note 5, at 129 (quoting the European Convention for the Protection
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, art. 10, 213 U.N.T.S. 222,
230).
7. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, art. 10, 213 U.N.T.S. 222, 230.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
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law, has a legitimate aim, and is necessary in a democratic society."
With respect to the latitude given to judges under Article 10(2),
the Court held that the restrictions contained in Article 10(2)
"must be narrowly interpreted and the necessity for any
restrictions must be convincingly established.'
12
Despite this declaration of judicial restraint, the Court
created an inconsistent analytic framework for its freedom of
expression jurisprudence. Specifically, the Court's standards of
review for freedom of expression cases vary based on who is
speaking and who is listening.13 The defining factor in the Court's
decision to apply either a loose or strict level of scrutiny to
freedom of expression cases is the decision of the person against
whom the speech is aimed to purposefully avail herself or himself
of the public arena by running for election. An examination of
case precedent reveals that the Court applied a low level of
scrutiny in cases involving speech by private individuals against
unelected law enforcement officials. In these cases, the Court
ruled that while there was interference with an applicant's freedom
of expression under Article 10(1), that interference fell within the
list of valid restrictions set forth in Article 10(2) such that there
was no Article 10 violation. In contrast, the Court generally
employed a high level of scrutiny in cases involving speech by the
press against elected politicians or legislators 5 In these cases, the
Court ruled that there was infringement of the applicant's Article
10(1) rights, but found that the interference did not come within
the list of valid restrictions contained in Article 10(2) such that
there was a violation of an applicant's Article 10 rights. The
11. Amit Mukherjee, International Protection of Journalists, Problem, Practice, and
Prospects, 11 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. LAW 339, 374 (1994).
12. Elena Yanchukova, Criminal Defamation and Insult Laws, 41 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 861,876 (2003) (quoting The Observer and Guardian v. United Kingdom,
216 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 30 (1992)).
13. E.g., Pedersen v. Denmark, 81 (Eur. Ct. Hum. Rts., June 19, 2003), at
http://www.echr.coe.int; Skalka v. Poland, 38 Eur. H.R. Rep. 1, 10 (2004); Lesnik v.
Slovakia, 52 (Eur. Ct. Hum. Rts., Mar. 11, 2003), at http://www.echr.coe.int; Ninkula v.
Finland, 2002-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 291, 312 (2002); Krone Verlag GMBH & Co. KG v.
Austria, J 37 (Eur. Ct. Hum. Rts., Feb. 26, 2002), at http://www.echr.coe.int; Unabhangige
Initiative Informationsielt v. Austria, 2002-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 271, 284 (2002); Dichand v.
Austria, 51 (Eur. Ct. Hum. Rts., Feb. 26, 2002), at http://www.echr.coe.int.
14. Pedersen, 83, at http://www.echr.coe.int; Skalka, 38 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 10;
Lesnik, 53, at http://www.echr.coe.int; Nikula, 2002-11 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 310.
15. Krone, 37, at http://www.echr.coe.int; Unabhangige, 2002-1 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 284;
Dichand, 51, at http://www.echr.coe.int.
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divergence of the Court's standards of review rests on its
treatment of the "necessary in a democratic society" requirement
found in Article 10(2). Under both classes of cases, the category of
the speaker is of secondary importance to the category of the
affected listener, or person against whom the speech is directed.
This Note will argue that the Court should apply a uniform
standard of review in freedom of expression cases, rather than the
bifurcated standard of review that the Court currently employs.
Specifically, the Court should consistently apply the stricter
standard of review that it uses in cases of speech aimed at elected
legislatures. By using different standards of review in freedom of
expression cases, the Court makes a value judgment as to the
worth of certain speech, and the importance of protecting certain
classes of affected listeners. The Court holds that the unelected
public officials' right to be protected from critical speech is more
important than the elected legislators' rights to be protected from
such speech. In addition, the Court's desire to protect unelected
civil servants as members of the judiciary machine eclipses any
importance it may give to the status of the speaker. The result of
the Court's decision to apply a high level of scrutiny in cases where
speech is directed at elected legislators is that the limits of
acceptable criticism are wider in such cases. Conversely, with the
Court's application of a lower standard of review in cases where
speech is directed at unelected public officials, less can be said in
such instances. 16 This bifurcated framework thus embodies the
Court's personal preferences and opinions for protecting certain
persons at the cost of chilling the speech of others and acts to
erode the fundamental rights contained in Article 10.
II. PEDERSEN'S BACKDROP: PREVIOUS ARTICLE 10 CASES
In 2003, the Court rendered a decision in Pedersen v.
Denmark that broke new ground as it represented the merger of
the two classic classes of freedom of speech cases. Unlike the more
common classes of cases in which the press directs its speech
toward elected legislators, or an individual directs her or his
speech toward unelected officials, in Pedersen, the press directed
its speech toward unelected members of the judicial machine.
16. Yanchukova, supra note 12, at 882-83.
17. Pedersen, 83, at http://www.echr.coe.int.
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The Court's decision in Pedersen falls within its traditional
analytical framework of treating the status of the affected listener,
not the speaker, as the dispositive factor in determining which
level of scrutiny to apply. The Court thus analyzed this case under
the looser freedom of expression standard that it utilizes where the
speech of private individuals is directed towards law enforcement
officers.1
8
In Pedersen the Court erroneously held that the Danish
court's conviction of two television producers for defamation of a
police chief did not violate those individuals' rights to freedom of
expression under Article 10 of the Convention.19 Specifically, the
Court ruled that the applicants' claim of a violation of their Article
10 rights satisfied Article 10(1) because there was interference
with their freedom of expression.20 However, the Court held that
the applicants' case could not succeed because the applicants' did
not disprove that the interference was "necessary in a democratic
society" under Article 10(2).21
As stated, the difference between the two levels of scrutiny
that the Court employs is rooted in its reading of Article 10(2), and
specifically the requirement that interferences with expression are
"necessary in a democratic society." Two recent cases, Skalka v.
Poland and Lesnik v. Slovakia, demonstrate the mechanics of the
lower freedom of expression standard of review. In Skalka, the
Court found that there was a violation of the applicant's Article 10
rights because the applicant's conviction was not "necessary in a
democratic society" under Article 10(2).22 The Court's ruling,
however, rested solely on the severe nature of the applicant's
eight-month sentence, not on the fact that the applicant was
convicted of a crime. 23 Indeed, the Court explicitly stated that a
shorter sentence would satisfy the requirement of the restriction
on expression being "necessary in a democratic society., 24 The
Court's analysis in this case is therefore instructive in defining the
parameters of its lower standard of review, which is fixed by its
treatment of what is "necessary in a democratic society."
18. Id. 1 61.
19. Id. 1 62.
20. Id.
21. Id. 91 83.
22. Skalka, 38 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 10.
23. Id. 91 39.
24. Id. 42.
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In Skalka, the applicant, a private individual, was convicted
by the Sosnowiec District Court of proffering insults against a state
authority at his or her headquarters or in public.2 The applicant
wrote a letter to the President of the Katowice Regional Court, a
judge, complaining about another unidentified judge to whom he
referred alternatively as a "cretin" or a "bully. 26 The applicant
advised the President of the Katowice Regional court that the
unidentified judge should release his aggressions on his dog or
mistress, but not on the applicant.27 The Austrian court found that
the applicant, "had acted with the firm intention of insulting the
Regional Court as a judicial authority" as opposed to insulting a
judge in his private capacity." Particularly, the Austrian court
ruled that "the impugned letter had.., exceeded the limits of
acceptable criticism and was directly aimed at lowering the court
in the public esteem.,
29
The Court held that the applicant's criminal conviction was an
interference with his freedom of expression under Article 10(1).o
Nevertheless, the Court found that the conviction was prescribed
by law, pursued a legitimate aim by upholding the authority of the
judiciary, and that the interference was not necessary in a
democratic society merely because of the length of the sentence,
not because the sentence was imposed.3' The Court concluded that
judges required the confidence of the public in order to fulfill their
role as the guarantors of justice."
In Lesnik v. Slovakia, the Court found that there was an
infringement of the applicant's freedom of expression, but that the
infringement was prescribed by law and necessary in a democratic
society. 13 Hence, the Court held that there was not a violation of
Article 10.34 The Slovakian courts convicted the applicant for
insulting an unelected public official.35 The national authority
found that the applicant wrote letters to the public prosecutor,
25. Id. 11-12.
26. Id. 1 10.
27. Id.
28. Id. 14.
29. Id.
30. Id. 33.
31. Id. 42.
32. Id. 34.
33. Id. 45, 48, 64.
34. Id. 1 65.
35. Lesnik, 25, 31, at http://www.echr.coe.int.
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later published by a third party.36 The national authority deemed
the letters to be defamatory, grossly offensive, and unsubstantiated
in their allegations that the prosecutor behaved abusively and
unlawfully.37
By contrast, Krone v. Austria demonstrates the mechanics of
the stricter freedom of expression standard of review, as applied to
cases in which the press directs its speech against elected public
officials. In Krone, the applicant appealed from a permanent
injunction prohibiting the applicant, a newspaper publisher, from
publishing a picture of the plaintiff, a member of the Austrian
National Assembly and the European Parliament, with text
alleging that the plaintiff received certain salaries unlawfully.38 The
Austrian court considered the injunction necessary because the
plaintiff was not known to the public, and his picture had "no
information[al] value [and]... was irrelevant to the question
whether the content of the articles was true. ' 9
The Court held that there was a violation of the applicant's
Article 10 rights.40 The Court found that there was an interference
with the applicant's freedom of expression under Article 10(1).
41
Further, under Article 10(2) the Court ruled that the interference
was prescribed by law, as it had a legal basis in Austrian law, and
pursued the legitimate aim of the protection of the rights and
reputation of others. 2 Consistent with its higher judicial standard
in such cases, however, the Court found that the interference was
not "necessary in a democratic society."
43
In its conclusion that the interference was not "necessary in a
democratic society," the Krone Court began by stating that while
Contracting States should be given a sizable margin of
appreciation, the Court ultimately has the power to make the final
decision in such determinations." The Court next repeated the
bifurcated standard within which it decides Article 10 cases, and
stated that "there is little scope for restrictions on political speech
36. Id. [31.
37. Id. $$ 32-33.
38. Krone, at 3, 10, 14, at http://www.echr.coe.int.
39. Id. 14.
40. Id. 39.
41. Id. 21.
42. Id. $$ 25, 28.
43. Id. 39..
44. Id. 33.
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
or questions of public interest., 45 Krone involved the criticism of a
politician on a matter of public concern.46 Hence, the Court found
that the plaintiff had willingly entered the public arena, and an
injunction against printing a photograph of him with text alleging
that he had unlawfully received his salary was not necessary in a
democratic society.47 Having examined the Court's bifurcated
freedom of expression standard, one is equipped to analyze the
Pedersen decision.
III. THE PEDERSEN CASE
A. The Facts
As stated, Pedersen represents the convergence of the two
standards that the Court employs in its freedom of expression
jurisprudence. In this case, two Danish nationals, Mr. Jorgen
Pedersen and Mr. Sten Kristian Baadsgaard, ("applicants")
claimed that the Supreme Court of Denmark violated their
freedom of expression rights under Article 10 of the Convention
by convicting them of defaming the personal honor of the Chief
Superintendent. Specifically, the Supreme Court of Denmark
convicted the applicants of making allegations which would belittle
the Chief Superintendent in the eyes of his fellow citizens.49
The applicants were employed as producers at Danmarks
Radio, one of the two national television stations in Denmark.50 In
1990, the applicants produced two television programs, entitled
"Convicted of Murder" and "The Blind Eye of the Police," in
which they claimed that in a murder trial an individual was
wrongly convicted of killing his wife by the High Court of Western
Denmark, and that the police undertook a "scandalously bad"
investigation of the allegedly guilty individual.5 The applicants'
television programs claimed that the police suppressed evidence,
including witness statements, which tended to prove the
individual's innocence. 2 In the latter program, the applicants
45. Id. '1 35.
46. Id. 10.
47. Id. $1 36-39.
48. Pedersen, 2, at http://www.echr.coe.int.
49. Id. 1 30.
50. Id. 9.
51. Id. IT 9-10.
52. Id. IT 10, 14, 15,18.
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posed the questions: "Was it [the named Chief Superintendent]
who decided that the report should not be included in the case? Or
did he and the Chief Inspector of the Flying Squad conceal the
witness's statement from the defense, the judges and the jury?"53
The applicants posed these questions while postin 4a picture of the
Chief Superintendent across the television screen. In the wake of
these television programs, the Special Court of Revision granted
the individual a retrial, which led to the individual's acquittal.55
The Prosecutor General also began an inquiry into the police
investigation of the individual's case.56
In 1991, the Chief Superintendent reported the television
station and the applicants for defamation. In 1993, the Chief
Constable in Gladsaxe decided to charge the applicants with
defamation against the Chief Superintendent. 8 In 1995, the City
Court of Gladsaxe held that the questions that the applicants
posed about the named Chief Superintendent in their two
television programs were equivalent to defamatory allegations.59
The City Court of Gladsaxe, however, also found that the
applicants had reason to believe that their allegations against the
Chief Superintendent were true.60 Accordingly, it did not sentence
the applicants to jail time.6' The applicants appealed this
62judgment. In 1997, deciding the matter on appeal, the High Court
convicted the applicants of "violating the personal honour of the
Chief Superintendent by making and spreading allegations of an
act likely to disparage him in the esteem of his fellow citizens,
under art 267, sub-s 1 of the Penal Code., 63 The applicants were
ordered to pay the Chief Superintendent compensation.64
In 1997, the applicants sought and were granted leave from
the Appeal Board to appeal to the Supreme Court.65 The next
53. Id. 9118.
54. Id.
55. Id. 9 22, 23.
56. Id. 22.
57. Id. [ 20.
58. Id. 25.
59. Id. 28.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. T1 30.
64. Id.
65. Id. T 31.
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year, in 1998, the Supreme Court upheld the High Court's
judgment that the applicants were guilty of defamation, and
increased the amount of compensation to be paid to the Chief
Superintendent.66 The Supreme Court held that the applicants
"made allegations against the named Superintendent which were
intended to discredit him in the eyes of his peers, as described
under Article 267, subsection 1 of the Penal Code., 67 With respect
to the identity of the affected listener, the Supreme Court further
stated, "[e]ven though being in the public eye is a natural part of a
police officer's duties, consideration should also be given to his
good name and reputation., 68 With reference to the other factor,
the identity of the affected listener, the Supreme Court stated that
"[tihe applicant's intentions, in the programme, of undertaking a
critical assessment of the police's investigation were proper as part
of the role of the media in acting as a public watchdog, but this
does not apply to every charge."6 ' The applicants subsequently
filed a complaint with the Court, asserting that their convictions
constituted a violation of their freedom of expression rights under
Article 10 of the convention.70
B. The Parties' Contentions
In Pedersen, the Court began its discussion by stating that
both parties conceded that the conviction by the Danish Supreme
Court constituted an interference with the applicants' rights to
freedom of expression under Article 10(1)."1 The Court also stated
that both parties agreed that per Article 10(2), the interference
was prescribed by law and pursued the legitimate aim of the
protection of the reputation or rights of the Chief
Superintendent. Thus, the only issue for the Court to decide was
whether the Danish Supreme Court's conviction of the applicants
was "necessary in a democratic society. 73
66. Id. 34.
67. Id.
68. Id. $[ 34..
69. Id. See also Stephanie Farriro, Molding the Matrix: The Historical and Theoretical
Foundations of International Law Concerning Hate Speech, 14 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 3, 70
(1996).
70. Pedersen, 91 47, at http://www.echr.coe.int.
71. Id. 9148.
72. ld.
73. Id. $1 49.
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The applicants made a number of assertions in support of
their position that their convictions were not "necessary in a
democratic society." The applicants first contended that the
questions that they posed in their programs concerning the Chief
Superintendent were not factual statements that required proof of
their truthfulness, but "merely implied a range of possibilities.
7 4
The government countered the applicants' assertions by
stressing three main points surrounding the circumstances of the
case.75 First, the government demonstrated that the applicants
were convicted of making unsubstantiated allegations of fact
against a named individual, not of expressing strong criticism
against the police.76 The government further claimed that the
Danish Supreme Court appropriately balanced the competing
interests defined in prongs one and two of Article 10.77 Second, the
government pointed out that the applicants were not convicted for
publicizing a witness's statements, but for alleging that the Chief
Superintendent committed a criminal offense by suppressing
evidence. 78 Third, the government argued that despite applicants'
claims, the questions posed by the applicants' programs were not
mere value judgments, but were statements of fact. 9 Being factual
in nature, such statements required justification which the
applicant did not offer.80
The Danish Union of Journalists also interceded on behalf of
the applicants. 8' It submitted comments stressing the idea that self-
censorship is the most fitting limitation on the press's right to
freedom of expression.82 Furthermore, the Danish Union of
Journalists contended that limitations on their right to freedom of
expression should be interpreted as narrowly as possible so as to
uphold the critical functioning of the press.83 The Danish Union of
Journalists additionally asserted that there should be no limits of
the press's freedom of expression when the press disseminates
information about the police and the judiciary who may have
74. Id. 50.
75. Id. [ 53-58.
76. Id. 1 53.
77. Id.
78. Id. 1 54.
79. Id. 56.
80. Id.
81. Id. 59.
82. Id.
83. Id. 59.
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performed a miscarriage of justice.8 This view supports the idea
that the Court should consistently employ its heightened standard
of review. This stance, however, is antithetical to the Court's use of
a lower level of scrutiny in cases where speech is directed against
unelected public officials such as the police and judiciary, opposed
to the higher level of scrutiny it utilizes in cases where speech is
directed against elected legislatures.
C. The Court's Analysis: Application of the Looser Standard
The Court began its assessment by defining the test employed
to determine whether an interference with an applicant's freedom
of expression under Article 10(1) is outweighed by a necessity in a
democratic society under Article 10(2).85 Under the test laid out in
86Sunday Times the Court assessed whether, "the interference
complained of corresponded to a 'pressing social need', whether it
was proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued and whether the
reasons given by the national authorities to justify it are relevant
and sufficient."8 7 Under this test the Court serves its supervisory
function by reviewing the findings of the national court in
question, while giving an appropriate level of discretion to the
national authority.8
The Court went on to discuss the importance that it gives to
the status of the affected listener in determining which standard of
review to employ. The Court analyzed the varying standards of
permissible criticism with respect to individuals, civil servants, and
politicians. 89 The Court found that, "it cannot be said that civil
servants knowingly lay themselves open to close scrutiny of their
every word and deed to the extent to which politicians do... .
Hence, as stated above, the Court held that the defining distinction
between the status of various classes of affected listeners is a
decision to purposefully avail oneself to the public arena.9' The
Court went on to stress the importance of protecting civil servants
from criticism:
84. Id. 60.
85. Id. 63.
86. Sunday Times (no. 1) v. UK, 38 Eur. Ct. H.R. 4 (1980).
87. Pedersen, 63, at http://www.echr.coe.int (internal quotations omitted).
88. Id. 63 (citing Fressoz and Roire v. France, 1999-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, 19 (1999)).
89. Id. 66.
90. Id.
91. Id.
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[C]ivil servants must enjoy public confidence in conditions free
of undue perturbation if they are to be successful in performing
their tasks and it may therefore prove necessary to protect them
from offensive and abusive verbal attacks when on duty. Public
prosecutors and superior police officers are civil servants whose
task is to contribute to the proper administration of justice. In
this respect they form part of the judicial machinery in the
broader sense of this term. It is in the general interest that they,
like judicial officers, should enjoy public confidence. It may
therefore be necessary for the State to protect them from
accusations that are unfounded.92
In its application of the above stated principles, the Court
agreed with the Danish Supreme Court's finding that the
applicants' introduction of a sequence of questions concerning the
Chief Superintendent amounted to an allegation that he
committed a criminal offense, the suppression of evidence. 93
Additionally, the Court agreed that the allegation was a factual
statement asserted by the applicants themselves.94
The Court next embarked on an inquiry as to whether the
applicants complied with the obligations that flow from making a
factual statement. To this end, in setting the standard of review,
the Court laid out the balancing act inherent in the two prongs of
Article 10: "[A]rt 10 of the Convention does not guarantee a
wholly unrestricted freedom of expression even with respect to
press coverage of matters of serious public concern."95 Instead, the
press is limited by "'duties and responsibilities' which come into
play when.. .there is a question of attacking the reputation of a
named individual and infringing the 'rights of others."' 96 With
these considerations in mind, the Court found that the applicants'
research could not adeguately support their allegations against the
Chief Superintendent. The Court based this finding on the fact
that the statements by a witness featured prevalently in the
applicants' programs might not have been trustworthy.98
Moreover, the Court noted that the Chief Superintendent was in
92. Id.
93. Id. 1 69-70.
94. Id. 1$ 71-72.
95. Id. 72.
96. Id.
97. Id. 82.
98. Id. 1 78.
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actuality prevented from commenting on the programs, and that
the program aired at a high viewing hour on a national television
station dedicated to impartiality.
99
Finally, the Court examined the way in which the national
authority determined whether the interference with the applicants'
freedom of expression was "necessary in a democratic society. ' °
The Convention grants national authorities a great deal of
discretion in their final determination as to what is "necessary in a
democratic society."1 1 With this margin of appreciation in mind,
the Court concluded that the Danish Supreme Court had
accurately identified the two sides of the interests at stake, the
right of the press to disseminate information in its role as "public
watchdog," and the need to protect the reputation and rights of
othersi 0 After balancing the competing claims, the Supreme
Court had held that the applicants did not have a sufficient basis to
launch their claims against the named Chief Superintendent93 The
Court agreed and, in turn, found that while there was an
interference with the applicants' freedom of expression rights, that
interference was prescribed by law and "necessary in a democratic
society." It thus concluded that there was no violation of
applicants' Article 10 rights.' °4
IV. CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF PEDERSEN AND FUTURE ARTICLE 10
CASES
A. The Court Should Employ a Higher Level of Review
While intended to protect unelected officials from critical
attacks, the loose judicial standard of review employed by the
Court in Pedersen, and other cases where speech is directed at
unelected public officials, has the perverse effect of failing to
protect a speaker's fundamental right to freedom of expression.
Practically speaking, under this low standard of scrutiny the Court
is unlikely to ever find a violation of an applicant's Article 10
freedom of expression rights.
99. Id. If 80-81.
100. Id. T 84.
101. Mukherjee, supra note 11, at 374-75.
102. Pedersen, 83, at http://www.echr.coe.int.
103. Id. 83-84.
104. Id. 84.
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Since the Court's application of its loose standard virtually
makes it a forgone conclusion that the Court will not find a
violation of an applicant's Article 10 rights, the Court simply
rubber stamps the judgment of the Contracting States when it
employs its lower standard of scrutiny. In this way the Court fails
to perform its supervisory function over the national authorities
and gives Contracting States carte blanche authority in their
rulings on certain Article 10 cases. Contracting States can rest
assured that the decisions of their highest courts will be upheld in
such cases.
Additionally, the Court's use of the lower standard of review
that it employed in Pedersen infringes on the fundamental
importance of the ideals set forth in Article 10 of the convention.
First, despite the Court's decision that the status of the speaker is
less essential than the status of the affected listener, the rights of
private individual speakers are no less important than the rights of
the press. In a free and democratic society the two are inextricably
linked. The press is merely a conglomeration of individuals with
their own biases and agendas. With the advent of the Internet age,
it is difficult to distinguish between individuals and the press. The
line distinguishing the two may be permanently blurred.
Second, in making the status of the affected listener the
dispositive factor in its analysis, the Court over protects unelected
public officials from critical remarks. An unelected member of the
government consciously decides to assume the responsibility of
upholding the laws of the nation. While their employment
activities are often more private than the well publicized conduct
of elected members of the legislature, discussion of their activities
should not be given a heightened level of protection. The very fact
that the conduct of unelected public officials occurs in private
dictates that there is an even greater need for publication and thus
accountability for their activities.
In this way, the need to promote free and robust public
discourse concerning matters of public concern can only be served
if elected and unelected public officials are subject to the same
level of criticism. Specifically, the risk of government overstepping
its bounds and infringing on individuals' rights to freedom of
expression is no less dangerous in the case of unelected officials.
Yet the Court consistently argues that it is an elected official's
decision to enter the public arena that is the dispositive factor in its
bifurcated framework. The key factor should not be whether a
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
public official has willingly entered the public sphere, but rather
the importance of free public discourse concerning the public
official's activities.
B. Guideposts for Future Article 10 Decisions
This Note argues that the Court can and should uniformly
employ a heightened standard of review in all Article 10 cases. In
looking for guidance on this path, the U.S. Supreme Court's
jurisprudence on freedom of speech challenges to convictions
based on defamation law is instructive. It should be noted that the
U.S. Supreme Court's jurisprudence on the topic of freedom of
speech is far from consistent. Like the Court, the U.S. Supreme
Court acknowledges a distinction between speech aimed at public
officials and figures, versus private figures. In freedom of speech
challenges to convictions based on defamation, however, the U.S.
Supreme Court generally employs a strict level of review."" The
standard the Supreme Court applies to cases concerning public
officials and figures is akin to the one advocated in this Note and
the one used by the Court in cases in which speech is directed
towards elected public officials.
Per the U.S. Supreme Court's milestone decision in New York
Times v. Sullivan, the U.S. Supreme Court stated that the common
law tort of defamation is not outside the reach of the First
Amendment, and that the two interests must at all times be
balanced against each other.O0 In this case the U.S. Supreme Court
enunciated the "actual malice standard."1 7 Under this standard a
public official can only recover for damages based on defamation
concerning his official conduct if "he proves that the statement was
made with 'actual malice'- that is, with knowledge that it was false
or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.' , 10 8 The
Court should ennunciate a similar standard.
Although like the Court, the U.S. Supreme Court delineates
between public and private persons, this Note advocates that the
uniformity of application to public persons, and rationale behind
the "actual malice" standard, make it an ideal guidepost from
105. See Victor C. Romero, Restricting Hate Speech Against "Private Figures," 33
COLUM. HUMAN RIGHTS L. REV. 1, 20 (2001).
106. 376 U.S. at 254; see also Allan Ides & Christopher N. May, Constitutional Law:
Individual Rights § 8.3.4, at 329-31 (2004).
107. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 279.
108. Id. at 279-80.
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which the Court may chart its new path of applying a consistently
stricter standard to all of its Article 10 cases. The U.S. Supreme
Court articulated the rationale behind the actual malice standard
as recognizing the need for uninhibited, robust, and wide-open
public debate in a democratic society.1 9 A looser standard would
impermissibly limit the fundamental right to freedom of
expression and dangerously chill the public discourse.'
V. CONCLUSION
In the words of Justice Cardozo, freedom of expression is the
"matrix, the indispensable condition, of nearly every other form of
freedom.""' In this way, "freedom of expression acts as a
gatekeeper to the additional freedoms that benefit the citizen.
'"112
This freedom, however, must be balanced against the rights of
individuals to protect themselves and their reputations against
unwarranted attacks. The law of defamation seeks to serve that
purpose. Defamation law and the freedom of expression thus
pursue opposite aims; "Unlike defamation law, which seeks to
limit harmful statements, freedom of expression encourages public
discourse." 113 The New York Times actual malice standard serves
as a compromise for these two valid interests by protecting against
the ramifications of suppressing too much expression while
protecting elected or unelected officials from unfair attack.
Speech against an unelected public official is no less
important than speech against an elected legislator, and should not
be granted a lower level of judicial review. Such differing
standards of review erode the fundamental importance of freedom
of expression in democratic societies. In future years, the Court
must strike an effective balance between these two opposing
rights. To this end, the Court should adopt the higher standard of
review that it utilizes in cases concerning politicians, and use the
U.S. jurisprudence as a guidepost in shaping its analytical
framework.
109. Id. at 270.
110. Id.
111. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 327 (1937).
112. Yanchukova, supra note 12, at 875.
113. Bonnie Docherty, Defamation Law: Positive Jurisprudence, 13 HARV. HUM. RTS.
J. 263,266 (2000).
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